

When Britain pulled out of Rhodesia after the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the CIA worked to ferret out details of the sanction-busting. In the popular traditions of spying, secret documents disappeared were used to convey messages in invisible ink. It was a shock to one of the informers was a prominent lawyer. But it was not the CIA had expanded into an area where the British were unactive in Egypt, Iran and Syria. E. H. COOKRIDGE ends his column and looks at the Director, Richard Helms

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# DEAD LETTERS

## IN SALISBURY

**M**ANY of the bright young men Allen Dulles had recruited to CIA from law offices and universities had gained their spurs in London, where they were sent to glean some of the methods of the British Secret Intelligence Service. Dulles enjoyed making wisecracks about the Victorian and Indian Army traditions still surviving in the British secret service, but he had a healthy respect for its unrivalled experience and great professionalism. He knew that CIA could learn a lot from the British about operations in the Middle East and Africa, where its stations were rapidly expanding.

After Archibald Roosevelt, one of CIA's foremost "Arabists", had restored cordial relations with SIS when station head in London, a plan of co-operation was devised for Africa, where most of the former British colonies had gained independence, and were becoming subject to strong Soviet and Chinese pressure. Roosevelt was still in London when, in 1965, Rhodesia made her momentous "Unilateral Declaration of Independence" (UDI), which led to the conflict with the British Government.

There is no better instance of the strengthening of CIA-SIS collaboration than the hitherto undisclosed story of the services CIA rendered the British authorities in Rhodesia, particularly since about 1968.

Indeed, in assisting the British SIS in its thankless task of implementing the policy of economic sanctions against the Smith regime, CIA put its relations with the Portuguese in jeopardy. It has an enduring understanding with the Portuguese Government and its PIDE secret service on many aspects: NATO security, anti-communist operations, the use of radio stations in Portugal and her colonies, and of bases for the U-2 spy planes and Special Forces in Angola, Mozambique and Macao. However thin the

British sanction policy became, British consular offices and SIS men were supposed to watch the steady flow of Rhodesian pig-iron, tobacco, and other products through the Portuguese ports of Lorenzo Marques and Beira in East Africa to Europe and the Far East. Merchants and shippers there had made fortunes out of the traffic which the Portuguese were bound, by United Nations resolutions and agreements with Britain, to regard as illegal.

After the closure of British missions in Salisbury all information about Rhodesian exports dried up at source. At this juncture CIA stepped in to assist the British. It was not merely a labour of love. American tobacco syndicates in Virginia, Georgia, North and South Carolina, Tennessee and Kentucky greatly increased their production and sales to Europe when Rhodesian tobacco growers lost most of their trade through sanctions. Traditionally, Rhodesian tobacco was used for cigar and cigarette manufacture in Belgium, Holland, Germany and Switzerland. When these supplies dried up, European manufacturers turned to American growers. But by and by Rhodesian exports began to flow again, by the use of false certificates of origin and smuggling through the Portuguese ports and through Durban in South Africa, much to the displeasure of the Americans.

Thus, obliging the British and helping American business, CIA ordered its agents to ferret out the secrets of the sanction-busting schemes devised by Mr Ian Smith's regime. Soon the CIA station in Salisbury was bustling with activity. Since 1962 it had been headed by Richard La Macchia, a senior CIA official, who had joined it in 1952 from the U.S. Naval Intelligence and had come to Africa in the guise of an official of the U.S. Development Aid Agency.

Other CIA men were Cape Town, former Ambassador Francis M. W. who had a cloak-and-dagger reputation in Cuba and Congo due to his work and several of the most famous, Edward Salisbury.

Salisbury came to Salisbury in 1957 from the State Department; from 1959 he headed the East and South African section and, at the time of his new appointment, was Station Head in Pretoria. Among his various exploits he was reputed to have initiated the first contacts between the South African government and Dr Banda of Malawi.

The CIA agents were perpetually journeying between Salisbury and the Mozambique ports, and Murray was temporarily posted to Lusaka to maintain personal contact with British officials resident in Zambia. Mr Ian Smith and his cabinet colleague, Mr J. H. Howman, who looks after foreign affairs as well as security and the secret service of the Rhodesian regime, were not unaware of the unwelcome operations of the Americans. They suffered them for the sake of avoiding an open clash with Washington. Their patience, however, became frayed when it was discovered that secret documents had disappeared from the headquarters of the ruling Rhodesian National Front Party. Subsequently,

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## SYRIA

## Blusterers and Brinkmen

Even though Syria's invasion of Jordan was one of the prime reasons for the Arab summit, when President Noureddine Atassi showed up in Cairo to represent the Damascus government he seemed surprised that anyone was upset. "You said you would never permit the Palestine resistance movement to be liquidated," he told a furious Gamal Nasser. "Well, they were being liquidated and we tried to save them. What can be wrong with that?"

The Syrian force was pulled back quickly and with reportedly heavy losses. But it stayed around long enough to remind the world that the Syrians are still the biggest blusterers and brinkmen in the Middle East. When Richard Nixon dubbed them the "erazies" of the Arab world during a recent briefing for Midwestern newspapermen, it was one of

those rare assessments with which both Israeli and Arab leaders could agree.

**Renaissance Party.** The fanatical leaders of the Baath Party who run the Damascus regime have long been Nasser's hair shirt. The Baath (literally, Renaissance) originated in Syria during World War II, blending socialism with Arab nationalism. In 1961, they supported Syria's pullout from the three-year-old United Arab Republic, thus ending Nasser's dream of an Egyptian-led Arab bloc. Currently controlled by a minority Moslem faction under General Salah Jadid, who wields the real power over the party, Syria has been rocked by no fewer than 16 coups in the past 21 years, many resulting from intraparty feuds.

When the Russians started pouring vast amounts of aid into the Arab world, Syria drifted quickly into the orbit of Soviet influence. Moscow is footing half the bill for a \$400 million high dam on the Euphrates, and has agreed to build oil-storage tanks at the Homs refinery and lay 500 miles of pipeline. In return, the Russians have been granted

full bunkering, refueling and repair facilities at the Syrian port of Latakia. Syria's radical rulers affect a style closer to Peking's brand of Communism than Moscow's, however, and they have never hesitated to play the two giants off against one another. When Soviet arms deliveries to replace weapons destroyed in the 1967 war fell behind schedule, Army Chief of Staff Mustafa Tlas journeyed to Peking. The Soviets caught up on their back orders.

**Delirious Policy.** Scarcely a year has passed in the last two decades without a public demonstration of savagery by the men who hold power, or covet it, in Syria. Prime Ministers have been shot and opponents of the regime have been killed in mass executions; two Jews, labeled Israeli spies, have been hanged—and their bodies left on display for the delectation of the bazaar crowds.

Arab rhetoric is acknowledged to be overblown, but Syria's is sometimes in a class by itself. In their campaign of frenzied anti-Western propaganda, the Baathists once actually issued an official warning to the populace to beware of CIA "vampires," who were plotting to collect Syrian blood for wounded American G.I.s in Viet Nam.

Its foreign policy has been scarcely less delirious. Syria was one of the first Arab nations to supply Palestinian guerrillas with aid and training camps. They are perpetually threatening war against Israel. Last fall they sent tanks to seal off their border with Lebanon in an attempt to support Palestinian commandos there against the moderate Beirut regime. Nothing but scorn is reserved for the kingdom of Jordan: Atassi is fond of saying that "the liberation of Palestine passes through Amman," presumably along with Syrian tanks. Nor is neighboring Iraq counted as a friend though it, too, has a Baathist regime. The Iraqi branch of the party has been too independent to suit the Damascene Baathists.

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# U.S. Bumbling in Mideast Charged

By William Tuohy  
Los Angeles Times

BEIRUT, Jan. 18—Author Miles Copeland says that the American diplomatic bumbling he describes in his book, "The Game of Nations," resulted more from inexperience than incompetence.

"We had nobody who could speak Arabic and we didn't know anything about this part of the world right after the war," Copeland said here.

"The Game of Nations" is the hottest-selling book in the Middle East, sold out in most book stores. It is published in London and is due to be released in the United States in April.

It tells in fascinating and sometimes humorous detail what is described as the inside story of various State Department and Central Intelligence Agency operations in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt.

## Feisal Has It Translated

So revealing is it, particularly about Egypt and President Nasser, that Saudi Arabia's King Feisal, as well as other Arab leaders, have had copies translated into Arabic.

Copeland, 53, from Birmingham, Ala., was an Office of Strategic Services officer during World War II, then vice consul in Syria, and later a management consultant to the CIA, working for the firm of Booz, Allen and Hamilton. He now runs his own consultant firm in association with Kermit Roosevelt, another former OSS-CIA operator in the Middle East.

In visits to Cairo over the years, Copeland became perhaps the closest American friend of Nasser, and the book focuses on the U.S.-Nasser relationships.

## Nasser as a Hero

"If there is a hero in the book," says Copeland, "I suppose it is Nasser. And if there is a villain I suppose it is John Foster Dulles.

"Nasser may be flawed but he has demonstrated his ability to play in the big leagues with the major powers, and he has eaten American diplomats

alive. Dulles was always sending out special emissaries without letting the ambassador on the spot know what was going on. It did not make for constructive diplomacy."

Because of his friendship with Nasser, Copeland often

played the role of the Egyptian leader in the State Department "game center," where diplomats tried to figure out what various rulers would do under various circumstances.

Thus the book, says Copeland, "is an application of game theory to political analysis." As such, it shows how leaders of weak nations have been able to gain leverage far out of proportion to their strength because of the way major powers have courted them.

In the book, Copeland delineates the behind-scenes role played by U.S. diplomats, military attaches and intelligence agents in the 1949 Syrian coup, in the 1958 Lebanon crisis and during the rise of Nasser.

## Money Incident

"I didn't want to write another stuffy memoir," Copeland says. "I wanted to tell what really goes on in the power struggle among nations, not what is usually glossed over afterwards."

Copeland relates how, during the 1953 argument about the amount of U.S. aid to Egypt, he transferred \$3 million in unvouchered U.S. secret funds to be given to Nasser.

In counting the money, which arrived via Beirut, with Nasser's aide, writes Copeland, "we found there was only \$2,990,000. Hassan Touhami's only comment was: 'We won't fuss about the missing \$10,' whereupon he and his security guards climbed into a large Mercedes and headed for Nasser's residence on the other side of Cairo."

But Nasser received the money with a mixture of amusement and annoyance, says Copeland, and decided it

was an "attempted bribe." So, to spite the Americans, he decided to build an "unfunctional structure"—"something very large, very conspicuous, very enduring and very expensive—costing, oh, say, something in the neighborhood of \$3 million."

The result was the "Tower of Cairo," says Copeland, "which we American friends of Egypt see across the Nile every morning as we breakfast on our balconies at the Nile Hilton."

Though the book paints Nasser as a Machiavellian operator, Copeland says Nasser read it before publication and approved.

"Egyptian officials who know the real score like the book," says Copeland. "Those who don't know the score are horrified by it."

## Reasons for Book

There has been widespread speculation as to why Copeland, who presumably still has ties to the U.S. intelligence community, revealed so much inside material about the CIA and diplomatic operations.

Copeland says that the British journalist-spy Kim Philby was privy to most of the secret detail and that the Russians may be presumed to know about it.

There is another reason, it was learned.

A couple of other authors were working on books purporting to show that Nasser was a virtual captive of the CIA during his rise to power, and the agency felt it would be harmful to American interests to have this view taken seriously.

Hence, they were willing to open up secret files in the hope that Nasser would be shown to be an independent

nationalist trying to use the United States in what he conceived to be the Egyptian national interest.

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